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Organic production, while still a niche market in U.S. agriculture, is growing at a rapid 
rate. This paper argues that organic producers, particularly those seeking certification to 
sell at the retail level, share many characteristics with conventional producers who opt for 
contracting over independence. These include yield risk, search and transaction costs, and 
technological changes. Depending on the rate at which federal assistance programs grow 
and evolve to serve organic producers, contracting may become a popular choice within
the organic sector. In turn, contracting may come to cover a significantly larger share of 
agricultural production as the organic sector continues to grow.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine simultaneously the phenomena of contracting and 
organic production in American agriculture and to establish the possibility of a direct 
correlation  between  the  two  in  the  near  future  of  American  agriculture.  Contracting, 
particularly production contracting, is increasingly being chosen among producers as an 
alternative  to  independence  and  agricultural  spot  markets.  However,  this  choice  of 
contracting  is  only  popular  or  gaining  traction  among  producers  having  certain 
distinguishing  characteristics,  including  high  degrees  of  risk,  steep  costs  and  asset 
specificity related to inputs, and thin geographical spot markets in which to sell their 
outputs. The theoretical model presented in this paper is based upon a discussion of the 
literature  on  organic  production  and  contracting.  It  demonstrates  that  large-scale 
producers seeking to obtain certification to market organic goods to retail outlets meet 
many of the criteria typically used to describe farmers who opt for production under 
contracting.American agribusiness is changing. At all stages, from production to processing to 
retail, this change in agribusiness is marked by increased concentration and consolidation 
as  well  as  an  evolution  and  diversification  of  the  products  available  to  consumers 
resulting from the major American commodities. This change is being fueled largely by 
technological improvements that are facilitating cost effective large-scale production, as 
well  as  increasing  consumer  demands  for  quality,  food  safety,  and  product  variety. 
Contractual arrangements forged between producers and processors can be viewed as a 
form  of  vertical  integration  and  therefore  contracting  represents  one  of  the  most 
significant ways in which agribusiness is changing.
The percentage of U.S. agricultural production covered by contracting has increased 
from 28 percent in 1991 to 39% in 2003. As the number of farms in the U.S. continues to 
shrink while the average size of farms continues to grow, the growth of contracting is 
expected to continue in the years to come (MacDonald and Korb (20006. It is vital to 
make clear the distinction between the two types of contracting available to American 
producers and the growth patterns observable for each. According to MacDonald, et. al 
(2004), marketing contracts consist of an agreement between a producer and a processor, 
specifying quantity and prices before the harvest. Under the terms of marketing contracts, 
farmers maintain ownership of their stocks, meaning they retain managerial control in 
addition to all associated yield risks. Production contracts, alternatively, turn managerial 
control and crop ownership over to contractors. Producer payments are in actuality fees 
paid  for  the  services  provided  by  farmers,  particularly  labor.  In  exchange  for  their 
autonomy, farmers involved in such contracts receive inputs, technology, and retail level marketing  from  contractors.  Table  1  reports  statistics  on  the  growth  of  agricultural 
contracting by commodity and contract type.
Table 1: The share of production under contract, by contract type and commodity, 1991-2003
Item 1991-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-2000 2001-02 2003
Commodities Produced under
Marketing Contract
Share of Total Sales
All Commodities 17.0 21.2 21.5 20.4 19.7 21.7
Crops 22.8 24.0 21.1 22.5 24.7 29.7
Corn 10.2 13.8 12.9 12.6 14.7 13.8
Soybeans 9.6 9.8 13.2 9.7 9.5 13.6
Wheat 5.8 6.2 9.0 6.9 6.4 7.5
Sugar Beets 88.5 83.7 74.6 83.1 95.8 95.1
Rice 19.7 25.2 25.8 30.5 38.6 51.8
Peanuts 45.2 58.3 34.2 44.9 27.9 53.3
Tobacco 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.9 52.6 50.9
Cotton 30.4 44.4 33.8 42.9 52.6 50.9
Other Crops 6.3 14.0 18.7 21.2 30.9 44.7
Livestock 11.6 18.2 22.0 18.4 14.5 13.7
Broilers 5.9 3.4 4.0 3.9 4.2 1.1
Hogs N/A 2.4 2.7 9.1 6.1 6.8
Cattle N/A 4.3 5.9 4.6 2.7 3.4
Other Livestock 0.1 6.8 4.9 10.7 3.5 7.4
Dairy 33.6 56.7 58.0 53.4 48.0 50.5
Commodities Produced under 
Production Contract
Share of Total Sales
All Commodities 11.8 13.0 10.6 16.9 18.0 17.5
Crops 1.9 1.9 1.8 4.2 3.1 1.1
Livestock 21.1 24.7 22.9 12.4 10.6 6.3
Broilers 82.8 81.2 80.1 84.9 88.1 95.5
Hogs N/A 28.7 47.3 76.3 78.1 84.8
Cattle N/A 14.7 11.1 19.7 18.3 25.4
Other Livestock 0.1 2.6 N/A N/A 5.5 N/A
Dairy 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6
Source: Economic Research Service Economic Information Bulletin No. 9 and the USDA’s 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).
As Table 1 shows, marketing contracting maintains a larger share of total production 
than does production contracting, but the growth in production contracting was more 
pronounced from the years of 1991 through 2001. In more recent years, the growth of 
production  contracting  seems  to  have  stagnated  somewhat.  This  is  largely  because production  contracting  has  come  to  cover  nearly  100  percent  of  production  for 
commodities which historically have seen growth in the area, such as broilers, hogs, and 
eggs.
Concurrently, the U.S. has seen a growth in certified organic production, driven by 
consumer demand for healthy and safe foods as well as efforts by producers to be more 
environmentally conscious. While organics remains a niche market and the share of total 
production under certified organic means is orders of magnitude smaller than that under 
contracting, the rate of growth has been striking. Table 2 reports the growth in certified 
organic  acreage  for  the  major  U.S.-produced  crops,  which  are  central  to  the  model 
presented in this study.
Table 2: Certified organic acreage, by U.S. crop, 1995-2001
Total certified organic (acres)










U.S. total 914,800 1,346,558 2,029,073 2,343,924 74 828,029,449 0.28
Total pasture
and rangeland 276,300 496,385 810,167 1,039,090 109 461,351,095 0.23
Total cropland 638,500 850,173 1,218,905 1,302,392 53 366,678,354 0.36
Grains
Corn 32,650 42,703 77,912 93,551 119 75,752,000 0.12
Wheat 96,100 125,687 181,262 194,640 55 59,617,000 0.33
Oats 13,250 29,748 29,771 33,254 12 4,403,000 0.76
Barley 17,150 29,829 41,904 31,478 6 4,967,000 0.63
Sorghum 0 3,075 1,602 938 -69 -- --
Rice 8,400 11,043 26,870 31,839 188 3,132,000 1.02
Rye 2,900 4,365 7,488 7,056 62 1,328,000 0.53
Beans
Soybeans 47,200 82,143 136,071 174,467 112 73,000,000 0.24
Dry  Beans 0 4,641 14,010 15,080 225 1,429,900 1.05
Vegetables
Tomatoes 0 2,322 3,063 3,451 49 381,870 0.90
Lettuce 0 5,743 11,410 16,073 180 335,200 4.80
Carrots 0 3,323 5,665 4,757 43 119,640 3.98
Fruits
Citrus 0 6,099 6,509 9,741 60 1,089,900 0.89
Apples 0 8,846 9,270 12,189 38 431,200 2.83
Grapes 0 19,299 12,575 14,532 -25 977,970 1.49
Other cropland
Cotton 32,850 9,974 15,027 11,456 15 15,787,800 0.07
Peanuts 0 2,969 2,085 4,653 57 1,543,000 0.30
Potatoes 0 4,335 5,433 7,533 74 1,267,100 0.59
Source: Economic Research Service Agricultural Information Bulletin No. 780Table 2 shows that for nearly every major American crop, there has been significant 
growth in acreage dedicated to certified organic production. Probably most striking is the 
74% overall growth in certified organic farmland in only five years, from 1997 to 2001. 
These acreage calculations do not take into account farms producing organically without 
production. While these farms greatly outnumber their certified counterparts, they are 
orders of magnitude smaller than the certified farms on average and they typically market 
directly  to  consumers  through  programs  such  as  local  farmers’  markets  (Dimitri  and 
Greene, 2003). 
Despite this boom in organic production, Table 2 also shows that organics remain a 
niche market in U.S. agriculture. Organic produce has captured the greatest share of total 
U.S. production yet no organic fruit or vegetable has yet be produced at five percent the 
level  of  the  conventional  substitute.  Given  that in  some  states  consumer demand  for 
organics  is  outpacing  supply,  it  is  likely  that  obstacles  to  more  widespread  organic 
production are currently in place. As summarized by Greene and Kremen (2003), these 
include high managerial costs, risks associated with the new means of production, and a 
lack of Federally funded insurance or assistance for organic producers. Included in the 
managerial costs are the costs associated with obtaining certification to market organic 
commodities to the retail sector, which is a necessity in order to obtain organic premiums.
This study argues that a growing portion of U.S. producers-those seeking organic 
certification, may come to view contracting as a viable outlet for their wares despite 
working with commodities that previously have been dominated by spot markets. The 
process  of  switching  from  conventional  production  to  organic  production  and 
simultaneously  seeking  certification  involves  a  period  of  time  involving  high  costs, considerable  yield  risk,  and  uncertain  market  conditions.  Therefore  production 
contracting  specifically  that  has  a  greater  potential  to  expand  into  new  commodities 
markets with the growth of organic production than market contracting. 
II. The Issues Faced by Organic Producers
A review of the literature on contracting, and in particular production contracting, reveals 
that there are several major motivation factors in influencing a producer’s choice between 
autonomy and contracting. These include yield risk, price risk, asset specificity and costs 
related to inputs, search and transaction costs associated with finding markets for outputs, 
technological change, and farm size. In this section each of these issues is dealt with in 
turn, and the relevance to transitional organic production is discussed.
Yield Risk
This  is  likely  to  be  the  single  greatest  factor  in  motivating  transitional  organic 
producers to choose contracting. Organic production in its current manifestation involves 
a  higher  degree  of  yield  risk  than  conventional  production,  on  average  (Greene  and 
Kremen,  2003;  Wossink  and  Kuminoff,  2005).  This  is  due  to  a  variety  of  factors, 
including  the  management  intensive  methods  of  pest  and  weed  control.  Biorational 
pesticides typically take a period of years to take full effect, implying that the risk of 
damage to crops from pests or weeds is especially high in the beginning years of organic 
production. 
The despoilment of organic products prior to processing or retail sale is another form 
of yield risk faced by organic producers. Organic commodities are more perishable than 
conventional substitutes and are more susceptible to aesthetic defects that deter consumer 
demand (Dimitri and Greene, 2002).  Despite these risks associated with organic  yields,  organic producers do not have 
access  to  crop  insurance  or  other  federally  funded  assistance  programs.  Producers 
responding to surveys have frequently reported these risks as deterrents to making the 
switch to organic production. There are federal initiatives underway to financially support 
organic  producers  and  reduce  yield  risk,  such  as  Certification  Cost-Share  Support, 
Marketing  Order  Exemptions,  and  several  provisions  in  the  2002  Farm  Act.
2  These 
initiatives  remain  in  their  development  stages  and  do  not  provide  aid  to  all  organic 
producers seeking certification. For example, the Certification Cost-Share Support helps 
to  defray  the  costs  associated  with  the  three-year  transitional  period  for  organic 
producers. But this provision does not cover the state of California, which is the largest 
state in terms of organic production, and the largest payments offered by this program 
only cover the costs for small operations.
Organic producers, particular those seeking certification, therefore have a two-fold 
incentive to seek out contracts. Production contracts for which payment is based solely 
upon the process of growing and harvesting a crop for a set period of time transfers large 
amounts of yield risk on to contractors, unlike in the case of marketing contracts which 
lump all yield risk onto the producers. Further, contracting in general provides producers 
with guaranteed markets for their wares and reduces the search time for market outlets. 
Any  means  by  which  to  reduce  the  period  of  time  between  stages  of  production  is 
valuable for all parties involved in the case of organics.
Price Risk
Production contracts have become very popular among U.S. livestock producers as a 
tool with which price risk can be reduced or even eliminated. Under many such contracts, 
                                                
2 See Greene and Kremen (2003) for a discussion on the various initiatives being implemented.the fees paid to producers in the form of grower compensation are agreed upon before the 
livestock are grown and sold. In such cases, the payment received by producers is largely 
unrelated  to  the  market  price  of  the  slaughtered  livestock  and  hence  price  risk  is 
eliminated  (MacDonald,  et.  al  2004).  Production  contracts  have  remained  unpopular 
among smaller, more diversified crop farms.
The few studies that have looked at prices received for organics reveal that not only is 
there  a  significant  premium  for  organics  at  the  retail  level.  Moreover,  this  premium 
results in organic producers receiving higher prices and in many cases higher profits than 
conventional  producers  working  with  the  same  commodity  (Kremen,  Greene,  and 
Hanson, 2003). These premiums are not reaped, however, by transitional producers of 
organics seeking certification. The output from these producers cannot legally be labeled 
organic and therefore  cannot  be sold  for organic  prices (Greene  and  Kremen, 2003). 
There remains no evidence that transitional producers face significant price volatility, but 
incentives remain to use contracting to lock in competitive prices in order to cover the 
costs of certification. This is especially true given that transitional organic products must 
compete directly with conventional products, which are of more uniform quality in the 
eyes of consumers (Thompson and Kidwell, 1998). Overall, output price risk more likely 
to motivate transitional producers in favor of marketing contracts rather than production 
contracts.
Asset Specificity and Costs Related to Inputs
Factors related to farming inputs have long been considered as motivating factors in 
the producer’s decision to choose contracting. Survey results have shown producers to 
utilize  contracts as  a means  by  which to  reduce  risks  related to  volatile  inputs  costs (MacDonald, et. al 2004). Furthermore, it has been shown that high degrees of input asset 
specificity motivate producers to choose contracts (Key, 2004). The argument for this 
relationship is as follows: highly specific inputs and capital tend to be expensive and 
difficult to obtain, and these expenses reduce farmers’ ability to diversify production. 
Diversification is a conventional mean by which to reduce risks, and thus contracting is 
used as compensation.
Input price volatility and asset specificity are not considered to be major concerns in 
the case of organic production, which is labor intensive and primarily employs inputs 
produced on  the  farm  (Greene  and  Kremen, 2003).  The debate  as to  whether or  not 
organic farm inputs are more efficient than conventional inputs, but there is no question 
that they are less expensive and commodity specific.
Search and Transaction Costs
The costs that producers face associated with finding outlets for their wares vary 
depending on the commodities being sold and geographical circumstances, such as the 
size of the regional spot market. While there is some debate in the literature regarding the 
costs associated with contracting in general, producers employ contracts to bypass search 
and transaction costs (MacDonald, et. al, 2004). Roberts and Key (2005) stressed the 
importance  of  including  search  and  transaction  costs  in  models  explaining  producer 
profits. The authors argued that as spot markets thin, these costs increase and independent 
farmers become more likely to opt for contracting. 
The  organic  sector  comprises  less  than  two  percent  of  the  total  U.S.  agricultural 
industry (Dimitri and Greene, 2002) and at all stages of production organic agriculture 
remains marked by constant change. Uncertainty regarding the market structure of the organic  industry,  including  the  functionality  of  organic  spot  markets,  remains  an 
impediment to the continued growth of the sector. For this reason the majority of organic 
farms are small and sell their products directly to consumers. Organic producers wishing 
to market their products on a larger scale have incentive to enter into contracts, of either 
variety, with processors in order to avoid paying relatively high search and transaction 
costs on top of the certification fees already in place. 
Technological Change
Processors who assumed managerial control over commodities in production have 
incentive to minimize costs by utilizing the most recent and efficient technology. This is 
a major reason why farmers and ranchers enter into production contracts (MacDonald, et. 
al,  2004).  Moreover,  producers  undertaking  new  technology  take  on  increased  initial 
costs  due  to  changing  inputs  and  capital  as  well  as  potential  risks  of  failure  or 
inefficiency. The managerial input producers received through production contracts assist 
in the use of new technology and share the associated risks. The U.S. hog industry is one 
marked by rapid technology change and a simultaneously growth in the proliferation of 
production contracting (Martin, 1997).
Organic production is in itself a new technology. Given the rapidly evolving nature of 
organic production, farmers switching to organics may value access to the latest methods 
of production over independence. Additionally, any new technology applied to organic 
production runs the risk of being cost inefficient and organic producers have an incentive 
to share this risk with processors in order to remain profitable.
Farm SizeAmong conventional producers, large farms are more likely to enter into contracts 
with processors. As of 2001, 61.5 percent of U.S. farms with over $1,000,000 in sales 
produced under contract, while only 7.7 percent of farms selling under $250,000 had 
contracts (MacDonald, et. al, 2004). As the number of large, commercial farms in the 
U.S.  continues to  grow,  the share  of total  production  under contract  covered by that 
demographic is expected to grow.
Organic  farms  are  considerably  smaller  than  conventional  farms  on  average.  For 
example, the average organic farm in California is less than five acres in size (Klonskly, 
et. al, 2002). However, a considerable range exists among organic farms as large scale 
certified operations are increasing becoming more common. Despite the fact that most 
organic producers sell directly to consumers, Krissof (1998) found that large, certified 
organic producers are the least likely to engage in farmers’ markets or CSA’s. 
Concurrently, the demand for organic foods, particularly produce, is growing rapidly 
in on the retail level. As of 2000, more than half of all organic production is sold in 
conventional  supermarkets,  as  opposed  to  natural  food  markets  or  directly  from  the 
farmgate  (Dimitri  and  Greene,  2003).  Organic  producers  who  are  either  certified  or 
seeking certification are therefore likely to be among the largest in the organic sector and 
also  the  most  likely to  engage in  contracting  as  a  means  by which  to  promote  their 
outputs to the retail level.  
III. The Model
When examining the choices that farmers make when considering different approaches to 
production,  the  prevailing  practice  is  to  consider  the  infinite  time  horizon  when 
estimating  benefits.  Wossink  and  Kuminoff  (2005)  followed  this  approach  when weighing conventional against organic production, as did Martin (1997) and Key (2005) 
when considering the options producers face between independence and production under 
contract. This is a sound approach, especially when considering the switch to organic 
production, given that the change in production inputs for a transition to organic farming 
implies an indefinite commitment to organics. The model presented below allows for 
farmers to maximize utility over all future time periods, but constrains decisions such that 
utility for any given time period must not be less than some minimum utility level. 
The  model  representing  the  implications  discussed  in  Section  II  makes  two 
simplifying assumptions regarding crop farmers in the United States. The first is that 
utility increases linearly in expected profits for any given time period, and the second is 
that all crop farmers have some degree of risk aversion. Therefore, the producer’s general 
problem in the context of this study is given by:
(1) Maximize          CV F E CV U t ] , [
such that  t U Ut   ,
Where Π represents profits and CV represents the coefficient of variation of profits, 
or the standard deviation of profits normalized by expected profits. The single constraint 
on the maximization problem states that farmers make decisions such that for no time 
period greater than or equal to a single year can utility drop below a benchmark minimum 
utility value. It is important to note that this benchmark value of  U  is not necessarily 
uniform  among  producers  of  various  commodities,  nor  among  producers  of  identical 
commodities. For a given producer, it may represent the point at which household debt 
begins to accrue or that point at which a source of non-farm income becomes necessary to maintain a valued standard of living. The only implicit assumption regarding U  is that 
it exists and is finite for all crop producers in the United States. 
Central to the analysis of this study is the transitional period of three years during 
which conventional producers seek official organic certification, as described by Greene 
and Kremin (2003). Therefore the utility level that must, in particular, not be less than U , 
given by:
















which represents the utility for the three harvest years to come. Producers considering a 
switch to organic production are assumed to examine in particular their expected utility 
over the three upcoming years, weighing their expected utility for another three years of 
conventional production against that for three transitional years of organic production. 
The  formula  for  total  farm  profits  during  a  three-year  period  for  conventional  crop 
farmers is thus given by:
(4)  ) , ( c c c c c c c u n S l w k R q p      
Where pc represents the price received at the farm gate for the commodity produced 
and q represents total quantity produced during the three-year span. In order to represent 
the price risk that motivates the managerial decisions of crop producers throughout the 
United  States,  pc  is  assumed  to  be  a  random  variable  with  distribution  N( p ,
2
p  ). 
Quantity, alternatively, is reported as a constant to reflect the presence of production 
safety nets provided most commonly in the form of government subsidization. That is, 
conventional farmers are assumed to receive support at times when natural conditions 
adversely affect yields.Rc is a vector reporting costs for the inputs used annually in the production process, 
given by the accompanying vector kc. Longer term capital expenditures, e.g. tractors and 
barn  structures,  are  not  included  this  dot  product.  All  farms,  both  conventional  and 
organic,  are  assumed  to  be  previously  established  and  without  heavily  deteriorated 
capital.  Rc  is  assumed  to  be  another  random  variable  with  distribution  N(r ,
2
r  )  to 
represent imperfect input markets. 
The wage rate, given by w, is assumed to be a constant in order to represent a labor 
market that is not necessarily perfect, but identical across both conventional and organic 
production sectors. The total amount of labor employed, l, is also given as a constant to 
represent certainty in the labor hiring decisions made by conventional producers. 
Finally,  the  formula  Sc(nc,uc)  represents  the  search  and  transaction  costs  paid  by 
producers, following the work of Roberts and Key (2005). Search and transaction costs 
are  assumed  to  be  a  function  of  the  number  of  agents  involved  in  the  producer’s 
geographical spot markets, nc, and the producer’s general familiarity with the prevailing 
market structure and the relevant outlets for the commodity produced, given by uc. Sc is 
assumed to be strictly decreasing in both n and u. Both nc and uc are assumed to be 
constants throughout the three-year period of interest.
The expected profits for conventional producers can thus be obtained:
(5) ) , ( ] [ c c c c c u n S l w k R pq E      
Given that the random elements of the profit function for conventional producers are 
known to be pc and Rc, an expression can be obtained for the standard deviation of profits 
during a three-year period:
(6)  ) , ( 2
2 2
c c r p c r p Cov      The covariance of output and input prices is not assumed to equal zero, as the general 
concept of profit maximization the two entities to be positively correlated. Thus there 
exists a dampening effect on the standard deviation of conventional producer profits.
In the case of conventional production, the three-year time period is intended to be 
representative of typical conditions faced and typical practices carried out by farmers 
employing conventional means of production and trading in competitive markets. In the 
case of organic production, however, the three-year model portrays the profit function of 
a  farmer  during  the  first  three  years  of  organic  production,  following  a  switch  from 
entirely conventional production.  Aggregate profits for transitional; organic producers 
over this time period are given by:
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In the organic case, po is considered to be a constant and strictly greater than p , the 
expected conventional price. That is, organic producers are assumed to receive higher 
prices than their conventional counterparts and to face no price risk due to high organic 
premiums  (Greene  and  Kremin,  2003)  and  demand  outpacing  supply  for  organics 
(Kremen,  Greene,  and  Hanson,  2003).  But  the  price  obtained  by  producers  seeking 
organic  certification, 
T
o p ,  is  strictly less  than po.  While  it  is  possible  for transitional 
farmers  to  obtain  premiums  on  organically  produced  products  by  selling  directly  to 
consumers, research on the nature of organic farms suggests this practice to be unlikely 
among producers seeking certification. As previously discussed, only the largest farms 
producing organic commodities seek certification due to the costs inherent in the process, 
and large farms are the least likely to seek directly to consumers through practices such as farmers’ markets or CSA’s (Krissof, 1998). Therefore, while considering only large 
organic producers seeking certification, it is assumed that 
T
o p  is approximately equal to 
p .
Output is reported as a random variable, as qo is a random variable with distribution 
N( o q ,
2
q  ),  with  c q <q.  This  formulation  is  intended  to  represent  both  the  smaller 
average size of organic farms and the risks associated with the yield, including factors 
such as biorational pesticides and despoliation prior to reaching the market. 
There  is  no  randomness  associated  with  the  input  prices  required  for  organic 
production, as the majority of the necessary inputs are assumed to be produced internally. 
Additionally, it is assumed that  c c o o k R k R    . 
The amount of farm labor required for organic production, lo, is assumed to be a 
random variable with distribution N(
2 , l l  ), where  c l l  . The probability distribution of 
organic labor represents the fact that organic production is more labor intensive than 
conventional  production  and  that  at  times  during  the  three-year  transitional  period 
varying amounts of manual labor are required to deal with acute issues such as infestation 
or weed control.
The number of agents involved in organic markets, no, is assumed to be strictly less 
than nc. Further, the typical organic producer is assumed to have less of an understanding 
of the existing market structure for outputs than producers working with conventional 
substitutes. This assumption is not intended to reflect organic producers’ abilities but 
rather the new  and rapidly  changing nature  of  the entire  organic  sector  in  American 
agriculture. This the distribution of uo is given by N(
2 , u o u  ), with  c o u u  . Given that market understand is the only stochastic component of the search cost function, So has the 
distribution N(
2 , s o s  ), where  c o s s  . 
Finally  C  represents  the  actual  cost  of  certification.  Despite  the  existence  of 
institutions  such  Certification  Cost  Share,  the  Conservation  Security  Program,  and 
Marketing  Order  Exemptions,  it  is  unrealistic  to  assume  this  fixed  cost  away.  The 
aforementioned programs, as discussed previously, are intended to help alleviate these 
costs for producers seeking certification but they are all in their development stages and 
they do not cover all organic producers. Hence we have that C > 0. 
Expected profits for transitional organic producers can thus be obtained by:
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Analogous to the case of conventional production, an expression can also be obtained 
for the expected standard deviation of organic profits:
(9) ) , ( 2 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 2
2 2 2
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The covariance between output and search costs is assumed to be zero, as is the 
covariance between labor and search costs. However, it stands to reason that as the scale 
of production increases in organic production, so does the likelihood of acute problems 
occurring, requiring adjustments to the labor force. Hence the covariance between output 
and labor cannot be assumed away and the final expression for transitional organic profit 
standard deviation is thus obtained:
(10) ) , ( 2
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Directly comparing the model’s results among the two kinds of producers, it is clear 
that expected conventional profits are higher than expected transitional organic profits. That is, unless conventional input costs alone are high enough to outweigh the profit 
advantages  yielded  by  conventional  producers  through  a  greater  scale  of  production, 
lower  average  labor  costs,  significantly  lower  search  and  transaction  costs,  and  the 
absence of certification costs. This is considered to be an unlikely scenario and hence this 
strict inequality is assumed to hold:
(11)  E[Πc]  > E[
T
o  ],
Moreover, it is assumed that the standard deviation of conventional profits is less than 
that of transitional organic producers. As with the comparison of expected profits across 
production methods, a formal proof to demonstrate this relationship is not possible but 
the assumptions inherent in the model imply that transitional organic profits are at least as 
variable  as  conventional  profits.  The  key  factor  in  determining  this  inequality  is  the 
uncertainty related to marketing and technical infrastructure, as stressed by Greene and 
Kremen (2003) and captured by 
2
s  . 
(12) c
T
o   
From (11) and (12), we have that the CV of profits is higher for transitional producers 
than for conventional producers. Therefore, for risk adverse farmers, it must hold that:
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Further, for highly risk  adverse producers who wish to seek organic certification, 
expected  utility  over  this  three-year  transitional  period  may  be  lower  than  U ,  thus 
precluding the possibility of switching to organics despite utility that could eventually be 
garnered from higher long term profits or creating less of an impact on the environment.
Producers who value the option to switch to organic production but are precluded 
from  making  the  switch  due  to  the  costs  and  risks  associated  with  the  three-year transitional  period  may  also  consider  the  option  of  production  contracting.  Profits 
associated with production contracting are given by:
(14) ) ( p p p p p u S l w q p    
Following  the  findings  of  MacDonald,  et.  al  (2004)  as  well  as  Key  (2005),  it  is 
assumed  that  p pp  ,  implying  that  producers  receive  lower  average  prices  under 
production contracts relative to conventional farmers but that there is no uncertainty in 
farmgate price. A notable absence from this profit formulation is input costs, which are 
typically  absorbed  by  contractors.  Sp  is  a  function  only  of  producers’  general 
understanding  of  the  market  and  given  that  contractors  serve  as  the  outlets  for 
commodities produced,  c p S S  .
The model, in conjunction with research on contracting income, argues that producers 
under production contract have expected profits at least as great as their independent 
counterparts. However, somewhat more relevant to this study is the fact that uncertainty 
is absent from the formulation of income under production contracting. Formally:
(15) 0  p 
The absence  of variability from  the profit  equation  reflects the  fact that  risk and 
uncertainty  is  considered  to  be  the  greatest  motivating  factor  among  producers  who 
choose contracting. Given that the choice of production contracting provides indisputable 
reductions in the standard deviation of profits and no discernible reduction in expected 
profits relative to conventional farming, it must be that:








o t CV U CV U   Therefore, the model demonstrates that producers interested in switching to organic 
production can improve their expected utility during the three-year transitional period by 
exchanging  independence  for  production  contracting.  Improving  utility  relative  to  U
increases to chances of the interested producer making the switch to organic and seeking 
certification. 
IV. Concluding Remarks
Virtually  no  data  are  available  on  the  incidence  of  contracting  among  organic 
producers. The Economic Research Service of the USDA now maintains data on organic 
acreage by state and commodity throughout the U.S. but at this point in time statistical 
analyses are precluded. However, the analytical research compiled by Dimitri and Greene 
(2003) demonstrates that a variety of contractual arrangements are already in place in 
organic  markets  such  as  wheat,  corn,  and  soybeans.  Interestingly,  the  conventional 
markets corresponding to these commodities are among the lowest in terms of contracting 
proliferation. 
The  model  constructed  in  this  paper  illustrates  that  contracting,  and  production 
contracting in particular, presents incentives to organic farmers seeking certification. As 
the organic market grows and attains greater amounts of recognition, federal assistance is 
expected  to  increase  for  organic  producers.  Looking  towards  the  future,  the  most 
pertinent question regarding federal assistance programs is whether or not they can keep 
pace with  consumer demand  for organics  and  therefore producers’  desires  to  capture 
higher profit margins through organic production.  
Numerous producer survey results, as well as the existence of contracts in the organic 
wheat, corn, and soybeans markets suggest that at the present time obstacles to organic production  still  remain  that  are  not  being  assuaged  by  federal  aid.  Agricultural 
contracting remains a somewhat controversial topic in the literature, and therefore a close 
monitoring of the growth and industrial organization of the organic sector is warranted 
for policy considerations.References
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